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Author(s): John K. Emmerson
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THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER FIFTY YEARS

/ John K. Emmerson

Fifty years ago, on July 15, 1922, a small, furtive band of determined bolshevists secretly convened the first Congress of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in a second floor room of a member's house in the Shibuya section of Tokyo. The first Party Program called for the abolition of the Emperor system, the Privy Council, the House of Peers, the General Staff, military conscription, as well as the institution of the eight-hour day and the guarantee of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and organization.[1] For the next 23 years communist party members in Japan led a hunted existence, spending time in and out of jail, meeting and acting clandestinely and enduring tightening police pressure as the decade of the 1930s advanced.

Today the JCP boasts 280,000 members, holds 14 seats in the House of Representatives (out of 486) and 10 in the House of Councillors (out of 250), and won as much as 12% of the popular vote for national constituency candidates in the June 1971 elections for the upper house. The JCP is the largest non-ruling communist party outside of Europe and vies with the French Communist Party for second place in the world among such parties after the Italian CP.[2]

The recent success of the JCP has been remarkable but it has come only after a stormy history which progressed from the relentless suppression of vigilant prewar police to the sudden first-strange freedom of an American-run Occupation through later vicissitudes of Red Purges and denunciatory directives from Moscow. Only within the last 15 years has the Party returned

[1]Tokuda Kyuichi, Shiga Yoshio, *Gokuchu Juhachinen (Eighteen Years in Prison)*, Tokyo, February 1947, p. 33. Tokuda states that the party was founded July 5 and the first Congress held July 15; he claims he was one of the seven members of the Central Committee; this has been disputed. (See George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, *The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 49). For full text of the Draft Platform of November 1922 see Beckmann and Okubo, pp. 279-282.

[2]Hoover Institution, *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs 1972* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, scheduled publication date, June 1972). Hereafter referred to as *YICA*.

to a line with some popular appeal and achieved notable success by seeking power through parliamentary means.

Nosaka Sanzo in China: the JCP in Wartime

During World War II, while surviving leaders were either imprisoned or exiled, one of them, Nosaka Sanzo was active in China, thinking about the future of Japan and of the Japanese Communist Party. Nosaka had not been present at the first Congress meeting but had joined the party soon after, entering from the labor movement in which he had been active from his early youth. He was arrested in the late 1920s and after release from prison, ostensibly for medical reasons, was ordered to Moscow by the Comintern. For the next ten years he divided his time between sojourns in Moscow and assignments in other countries as an underground agent; he visited the United States twice, once "before 1935" and again in 1936.[3] He hoped to return to Japan but this appeared too hazardous and instead he traveled to China in the company of Chou En-lai. He arrived in Yenan, the Chinese communist "capital," in 1940 but his presence was not disclosed until 1943—after the Comintern was dissolved—when the Chinese announced that Comrade Okano Susumu (his pseudonym in China), a representative of the Japanese Communist Party, had just arrived and been warmly welcomed by Mao Tse-tung and members of the Central Committee.[4]

To some of us who met Nosaka in Yenan while he was a guest of the Chinese, busily organizing his "Emancipation League" of Japanese prisoners of war captured by the Communist 8th Route Army, he outlined in detail the policy he thought a legal Japanese Communist Party should follow in the postwar period. This program embraced most of the party's original demands and differed little from the 1932 Theses propounded by the Comintern, in the writing of which he had probably participated.[5]

The first stage of Nosaka's three-stage revolution, in which militarism would be destroyed and democracy established, might last many years, depending on how well the government could assure "reasonable security and happiness" for the people. After a gradual transition, the bourgeois democratic revolution would be completed in the second stage, and socialism would be achieved only in the third and final stage.[6] Nosaka told us at the time that he never expected to experience the Japanese socialist revolution in his lifetime.

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[3]Nosaka disclosed in an interview in 1971 that he left Moscow for the United States sometime before 1935, returned to Moscow, then in 1936 again visited the United States where he engaged in party work on the Pacific coast. In 1938 he was summoned back to Moscow. *Akahata,* (Red Flag), Tokyo, August 20, 1971.

[4]Nosaka Sanzo, *Senshu, Senji-hen 1933-45* (Selected Writings, War Years), Tokyo, 1964, pp. 244-245.

[5]Beckmann and Okubo, *op cit.*, p. 230.

[6]John K. Emmerson, "The Japanese Communist Party," Department of State dispatch sent from Yenan, China, January 5, 1945; Enclosure IV, "The Program of the Japanese Communist Party," Discussion by Okano Susumu, September 8, 1944. The above is published in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China,* Vol.II, pp. 1231-1235.

The most remarkable point in Nosaka's program was his proposed treatment of the Emperor. Since 1922 every Japanese communist policy statement had denounced the monarchy. The 1927 Comintern Theses called for its abolition, those of 1931 demanded the Emperor's overthrow, and the 1932 Theses declared that destruction of the monarchy "must be considered the first of the fundamental tasks of the revolution in Japan."[7] Nosaka told us in 1944 that when the war ended, nothing should be done about abolishing the imperial institution; he believed the Japanese people were not ready to discard the Emperor, that the Japanese communists should not revive the old slogan "Down with the Emperor!" and that, in fact, the entire question of the Emperor's future should be left alone for the time being.[8]

In a speech to the Seventh Congress of the CCP, meeting in Yenan in April 1945, Nosaka declared that while the Emperor must be divested of the special status which had made of him an "autocratic machine" and while the communist party would not *welcome* his preservation, yet the reverence in which the Japanese people held him dictated a policy of caution. Thus, if the majority of Japanese wished to retain the Emperor, the JCP should agree; action to the contrary would risk unpopularity and the alienation of the Japanese masses.[9]

Earlier programs for communism in Japan had called either for the abolition of the Diet or for "dispelling illusions about the parliamentary system."[10] Nosaka, on the other hand, placed great reliance upon the Diet which he stated must have "full governing power," be totally free from the threat of "arbitrary dissolution by other constitutional organs" and have a cabinet responsible to it.[11] He elaborated to the Chinese Seventh Congress his stand on the preeminence of parliament, affirming that political power must be held by a reformed Diet elected by men and women over the age of 18 (at that time the franchise was limited to males over 25). Nosaka reasoned that if men at 17 were mature enough to enter military service, then 18-year olds were sagacious enough to vote.[12]

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[7]Beckmann and Okubo, *op. cit.*, pp. 308, 317, and 336.

[8]Emmerson, *op. cit.*, p. 1232.

[9]Nosaka, *op. cit.*, pp. 454-456. Nosaka entitled the speech: "The Construction of a Democratic Japan," and in an introduction stated that it was aimed not only at Japanese but at foreigners, especially Chinese and Americans, who held mistaken ideas about the postwar future of Japan. He was grateful that his speech was translated into both Chinese and English immediately after presentation. Lieutenant Koji Ariyoshi, then in Yenan and assigned to the Office of War Information, prepared an English version which was widely circulated within the United States government.

[10]The 1927 Comintern Theses demanded the "dissolution of parliament." The 1932 Theses warned that ". . . the Japanese parliament is an integral part of the present monarchist dictatorship" and . . . "while making full use of parliamentary elections and parliamentary work, and where possible taking part in them for the purpose of revolutionary agitation, the Communist Party must direct its work toward dispelling the parliamentary illusions of the masses." Beckmann and Okubo, *op. cit.*, pp. 308 and 349.

[11]Emmerson, *op. cit.*, p. 1232.

[12]Nosaka, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

Nosaka saw Japan's economic future in heavy and precision industry instead of in textiles and light manufactures. He believed an industrialized Japan could contribute to the development of other countries in East Asia and hoped that allied policy would not destroy Japan's industrial base and push the nation back into an agricultural age. This, he said, would be like killing a cow to get its horns, and would be a loss to the civilized world.[13] Americans who read reports of conversations with Nosaka were surprised that a communist leader would propose reforms which seemed so sensible. Indeed much of the program he advocated—changes in governmental structure, civil rights, land and labor reforms, universal suffrage, and the break-up of industrial combines—formed part of the U.S. post-surrender policy for Japan and was enacted into law during the Occupation.

The Japanese Communist Party during the Occupation

General MacArthur's civil rights directive of October 4, 1945 guaranteed freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and political activity, and ordered the immediate release of all political prisoners. These included communists and members of various outlawed radical and religious sects. Two of the best known prewar party leaders had been in prison since their arrests in 1928: Tokuda Kyuichi and Shiga Yoshio. By October 1945 they were in Fuchu prison near Tokyo and were released with all other political prisoners on October 10.[14]

Tokuda and Shiga published the first postwar issue of the Japanese Communist party organ *Akahata* (Red Flag) on October 20. It proclaimed that the Emperor system, enemy of many years, would rapidly disappear thanks to the armed might of the allied peoples and to "our" (communist) opposition within the country, but warned that "the system" would try to cling to its monopoly of political power and would do nothing to prevent death and famine. Unable to shake off their ingrained fear of police suppression, Tokuda and Shiga added a final warning (later carefully inked out by brush —at least in copies available to occupation personnel): "Please take every precaution to see that this copy does not reach the hands of the enemy!"[15]

Tokuda's and Shiga's "Appeal to the People" thanked the Allies for starting the "democratic revolution" and pledged support for their peace policies. The Appeal demanded the elimination of militarism, police politics, and monopoly capitalists, improved working conditions, the confiscation of land from absentee landlords, then denounced "pseudo-liberals" and "pseudo-socialists," and called for a united front. But their strongest

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 459.

[14] Tokuda and Shiga describe their arrests (*op. cit.*, pp. 53 and 115) and their release (p. 161). E. Herbert Norman, a Canadian diplomat then attached to the Counter Intelligence Section, SCAP, and the author, then a member of the Political Advisor's Office, interviewed Tokuda and Shiga at Fuchu Prison and later at SCAP Headquarters, Tokyo. Both were eager to discuss communist party history and their ideas about the future.

[15] "Saikan no Ji," (Greetings on Republication), *Akahata*, 1, Tokyo, October 20, 1945.

attack was against the Emperor system which included the Emperor himself, the Court, military and administrative bureaucrats, and the nobility.[16] Tokuda and Shiga had picked up where they left off 18 years before. The Comintern Theses of 1932 were still the guide for them.

Meanwhile Nosaka was making his way slowly and painfully back to Japan from China. Luckily for him, an American airforce plane took off from Yenan for the north on September 10; Nosaka, three of his companions in the Emancipation League, and 20 high ranking Chinese Communist military and party officials were permitted to board. The plane flew only as far as Lingchiu on the Shansi-Hopei border; from there Nosaka and his friends worked their way by foot, horse cart, truck, and train, to Kalgan in Manchuria, to Pyongyang, North Korea, where Nosaka conferred with the then youthful Kim Il-son, to American-occupied South Korea, and finally across to Hakata in Kyushu by ferry and on to Tokyo where they arrived January 13, 1946, four months after boarding the American plane in Yenan.[17]

Nosaka changed the policy of the JCP the moment he could talk with Tokuda and Shiga. Although a dedicated doctrinaire communist with a professionalism matured through long years of service with the Comintern and in the underground, Nosaka had the disarming appearance and personality of a quiet, reasonable, soft-spoken scholar. He exuded none of the fiery bombast of Tokuda nor the sharp persistence of Shiga. He had observed at close hand the remarkable success of the Chinese Communists in winning the peasantry to their side and had witnessed the campaigns of the 8th Route Army to make it possible for soldiers to live off the land, symbolized by the slogans: "Army Love the People! People Love the Army!" He believed that the communist party would have to make its way in an advanced, industrialized Japan—at least during the first stage of the revolution—by winning popular support. Fresh from China, Nosaka repeated his slogan "lovable communist party" to welcoming crowds at every whistle-stop on the rail journey between Hakata and Tokyo. Reminiscing 25 years later, he told an interviewer for *Akahata* that the prewar propaganda of an illegal party was useless in 1946. The changed atmosphere required a party to be supported, believed in, and loved by the people. In fact the very word "love" (ai), which had vanished in the agony of war, suddenly took on a fresh, popular appeal in the freedom of defeat.[18] Tokuda and Shiga bowed to Nosaka and from then on the party drew a careful distinction between the Emperor and the imperial institution.

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[16]Tokuda Kyuichi, Shiga Yoshio, "Jinmin ni Atau" (Appeal to the People), October 10, 1945, *Akahata*, 1, October 20, 1945, pp. 1-3. For English summary see Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1966* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1967), pp. 48-49.

[17]An account of Nosaka's trip appears as a serialized interview with him and two of his companions, Sato Morio and Yoshizumi Kiyoshi, "Inquiry of Chairman Nosaka, From Yenan to Tokyo" *(Nosaka Gicho ni Kiku, Yenan kara Tokyo e), Akahata,* August 15-September 15, 1971.

The Postwar Japanese Communist Party

In the newfound liberty of the Occupation, the Japanese Communist Party grew rapidly. A membership which had never exceeded 1,000 before the war expanded to 7,500 in 1946, to 70,000 by 1947 and to 150,000 in 1950.[19] While the triumvirate of Nosaka, Tokuda, and Shiga held together, their talents complemented each other. Nosaka impressed Americans by his quiet reasonableness. A prominent official in the Government Section remarked one day that it was such a pity Nosaka was a communist: otherwise, he would make an excellent prime minister! Japanese conservatives were alarmed by the communists and blamed sympathizers on General MacArthur's staff for their rapid rise. Left-leaning individuals did hold positions in SCAP sections but the destiny of the JCP did not depend on them; furthermore some SCAP organizations were vigilant in maintaining surveillance over communists, more so as time went on.[20] The new phenomenon was that for the first time in history communists could engage in politics like anybody else. It was natural that Japanese conservatives saw communist growth as a danger to themselves and to their kind of government. The JCP reached its apogee in 1949 by winning 35 seats and 9.7% of the popular vote in elections for the House of Representatives. The party has not again approached this parliamentary strength and only in 1971 surpassed this vote percentage.

In January 1950 the Cominform denounced Nosaka for seeking a peaceful transition to socialism and for embellishing the "imperialist" American occupation by treating it as a progressive force. Events followed in rapid succession in this most serious postwar crisis of the party. Nosaka promptly issued a "Self Criticism" in which he explained his past positions and admitted errors, confessing that he had been incorrect in suggesting that a people's government could be established by parliamentary means even under foreign occupation.[21] The party radically altered its policy in response to the Cominform criticism. Tokuda severely attacked the United States; party fissions widened; the JCP went into its "guerrilla warfare" stage and some party members vanished in the underground or left the country. On June 6 and 7 SCAP purged 41 JCP members, including 24 officers of the Central Committee. Tokuda left for Peking where he died in 1953. Nosaka disappeared. The JCP lost all of its 35 seats in the 1952 elections and its popular vote plummeted to 2.5 percent. As Scalapino has described it, the party became an iceberg with only a small tip showing.[22]

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[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

[20] Chalmers Johnson in *Conspiracy at Matsukawa* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1972) p. 358 refers to differing attitudes of the Government Section and G-2-CIC.

[21] *Nihon Kyosanto (Japanese Community Party), Gojunen Mondai Shiryo-shu* (Collection of Documents on the 1950 Question), Central Committee, Japanese Communist Party, Vol. 1, Tokyo, 1957, p. 18.

[22] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

Militancy failed and by 1955 JCP leaders were ready to change the line again. Nosaka reemerged to a tumultuous welcome at a Tokyo mass meeting on August 11, 1955.[23] He has not yet divulged his five years of underground activity; his absence from public life during the militant period preserved his association with a "soft" party line. Miyamoto Kenji was appointed secretary general at the Seventh Congress in 1958 and by 1961 had become the party's most powerful leader. Although the Sino-Soviet conflict presented complex problems and dilemmas and factional disputes characterized the period after 1955, Miyamoto followed basically the old Nosaka line, which then became the "Miyamoto line." Party policy embraced the concepts of a two-stage revolution (essentially identical to Nosaka's three-stage sequence), the pursuit of power through parliamentary means, and the united front.

The Present Japanese Communist Party

Diet representation of the Japanese Community Party, now often called *Yoyogi* after the location of its Tokyo headquarters, increased sixfold in the 11 years between 1960 and 1971—from 4 seats in both houses in 1960 to 24 in 1971. This is still a small proportion of the total 736 seats but reveals a rapid advance. The goal for lower house elections expected this year or early 1973 is 40 seats and the party is already channelling energies toward maximum results at the polls.

The 1970 Congress approved both a Resolution—"Prospects for the 1970's and Tasks for the Communist Party of Japan"—and revised Party Rules. In these documents the JCP claims to be an "independent, democratic" political party, pursuing its ends exclusively by parliamentary means, with an "historic duty . . . to establish during the 1970's a democratic coalition government" and calling for a united, anti-imperialist front, dedicated to peace, neutrality, and democracy. The objective is to win control of the Diet in cooperation with other "democratic forces," such as the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) with which a united front can be established.[24]

In February 1971 Miyamoto assured the members of the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo—a Japanese communist had never addressed this group before—that while the realization of a neutral, democratic Japan would eventually lead to socialism, the present aim of the JCP was not a socialist revolution but neutrality and democracy. The objectives outlined were far from startling to the assembled foreign journalists: achieving "independence" by abrogating the security treaty with the United States; improving welfare by controlling industrialists whose actions cause pollution,

[23] *Nosaka Sanzo no Ayunda Michi (The Road Nosaka Sanzo Has Travelled)*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 148.

[24] See *Akahata*, May 16, 1972, for complete text of Eleventh Congress Resolution: *Nanjunen-dai no Tenbo to Nihon Kyosanto no Ninmu* (Outlook for the 1970's and Tasks for the Japanese Communist Party).

high prices, and traffic congestion; preventing the revival of militarism; and setting up a truly democratic parliamentary administration.[25]

The JCP recognizes that it must appeal for votes to a Japanese electorate historically conditioned against communism, a force long associated with violence, dictatorship, and subservience to foreign domination. A principal party task is therefore to allay these fears and suspicions by creating an image of a democratic, independent, patriotic, "lovable," "smiling" communist party, genuinely interested in the welfare of the common man.

Democracy and non-violence: The 1970 Congress acted to make the party appear more "democratic." For the first time in Japanese communist history, meetings of the Congress—except those related to finances and personnel—were open to the press and public. Furthermore, the Resolution pledged the party, if it came to power, never to institute a one-party system, but rather to permit the functioning of opposition parties "so long as they did not attempt to destroy the democratic system by violence." Additionally the Rules were amended to define Marxism-Leninism as the party's "theoretical basis" instead of a "principle for action" and for the first time to introduce the concept of "morality"—i.e., that party leadership and action must conform to the "morality and reason of the social classes"[26]

The most systematic attempt to rid the party of the taint of violence was Miyamoto's campaign for a vocabulary change. The conspiratorial word "cell" (*saibo*) was abolished and the bland "branch" (*shibu*) substituted. Miyamoto announced that "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been mistranslated, that the true meaning of the original Latin *diktatura* had been lost. He proposed a Japanese word with a less shocking connotation, *shihai* or "control." Likewise, "violent revolution" (*boryoku kakumei*) was not a true rendition; he suggested the milder *kyoseiryoku kakumei* ("revolution by compelling power").[27] Miyamoto announced that a new social science research institute would thoroughly study the vocabulary of communism. His objective was to remove the stings of "violent revolution" and "proletarian dictatorship" and in their place publicize the more appealing theories of "centralized Diet power" and "more than one party even in a socialist state."

The JCP had demonstrated its opposition to violence through the youth movement. The bomb-throwing New Left has been the bitterest enemy of the JCP and no JCP-affiliated group has participated in the student violence of the past few years. Indeed, the JCP-oriented factions have on occasion helped police to quell riots of ultra-radicals. The extremist *Sekigun* (Red Army) which in 1970 highjacked an airliner to North Korea and the *Rengo Sekigun* (United Red Army) which horrified the Japanese nation by tortures and

[25] *Akahata*, February 27, 1971.

[26] See *Akahata*, July 6, 1970, for complete text of revised Party Rules *(Nihon Kyosanto Kiyaku)*.

[27] *Akahata*, June 24, 1971; Akiyama Junichi, "Nihon Kyosanto no Yogo Henka no Nerai," (Aim of the Vocabulary Change of the Japanese Communist Party), *Koan Joho*, Tokyo, June 1971.

mass murders in early 1972 drew explosive denunciations from Yoyogi which saw these fanatic youths as "blind groveling followers of Mao Tse-tung" and used the incidents to attack China.[28]

The JCP reacted sharply to charges of inconsistency because of cruelty in its own past when a Tokyo journalist revived a 1933 incident implicating Miyamoto himself in the mysterious torture and death of a communist party member. *Akahata* defensively explained that one of two spies discovered in the party's Central Committee had suddenly died of shock during questioning because of an inherent physical condition and in spite of artificial respiration and every effort at resuscitation. Miyamoto's postwar exoneration was cited and the journalist's motives questioned. The 1933 case was a famous one and occurred in a period when communist violence was not unusual.[29]

The question of communist violence is more significant for the future than for the past. A journalist asked Miyamoto in 1970 whether he could state categorically that the party would never use violence to seize power. Miyamoto replied, "We will not resort to such undemocratic methods as a *coup d'etat* . . . A *coup d'etat* is a self-destroying tactic. We will not act in such an irrational way."[30] Miyamoto's theoretical writings are less reassuring. In a book accepted as party doctrine, "Prospects for Japan's Revolution," Miyamoto leaves no doubt that the achievement of ends through peaceful means may not always be possible, that the enemy will determine whether the revolution is to be carried out by peaceful or non-peaceful means.[31]

Independence: For the JCP the implacable enemy is American imperialism. Since the 1950s the JCP has been in the forefront of opposition to the U.S.-Japan security treaty, to the maintenance in Japan and Okinawa of American military forces and bases, to the American administration of Okinawa, and to American policy in Indochina and East Asia generally. Thus "independence" means to the JCP breaking the security ties with the United States. But party independence is as important as national independence and the "autonomous independent" line has grown out of the quarrels

[28]"Boryoku Shudan 'Rengo Sekigun' no Shotai," (True Character of the Terrorist Band "United Red Army"), *Akahata,* February 21, 1972; "Taikokushugi-teki Kansho-sha no Sekinin," (Responsibility of Big Power Interventionists), *Akahata,* March 14, 1972; " 'Rengo Sekigun' wa Hatashite 'Motakuto Shiso' to Muen-ka," (Does "United Red Army" Truly Have No Relationship with Mao Tse-tung Thought?), *Akahata,* March 31, 1972; "Kasanete Moju, Boryoku Shudan wo Bika shita Shu-en-rai Hatsugen," (Chou En-lai Statement Repeatedly Idealized Blind Followers and Terrorist Bands), *Akahata,* March 31, 1972.

[29]*Akahata,* March 9, 1972; *Akahata,* April 15, 1972; Beckmann and Okubo (*op. cit.,* p. 244) state that the two spies were "brutally tortured" and that the "Red Lynching," as the murder was called, was "not the only case of violence involving communists in these years." Several other examples are given.

[30]*Yomiuri Shimbun,* Tokyo, July 8, 1970.

[31]Miyamoto Kenji, *Nihon Kakumei no Tenbo (Outlook for Japan's Revolution).* Central Committee, Japanese Communist Party, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 314-315. The references are from Miyamoto's Report to the Seventh Party Congress in July 1958 but are considered as current party doctrine. See Akiyama, *op. cit.,* for discussion of inconsistencies between this text and the argumentation for vocabulary change.

with the communist parties of both the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of China (CCP).

The break with the CPSU came in 1964, dramatized by the vote in the House of Representatives on the partial nuclear test ban treaty, when Shiga Yoshio, and a member of the Central Committee, one of the three early postwar leaders, voted for the treaty in violation of party discipline, and in the presence of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, who sat in the visitor's gallery.[32] Shiga was ousted and promptly organized a splinter party "The Voice of Japan" which today has 500 members and which received moral encouragement and material aid from Moscow. Representatives of the parties tried in 1968 to heal the rift, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia intervened, an act which the JCP strongly condemned. Inter-party relations worsened in 1970 but attempts at reconciliation were resumed in 1971 and a JCP representative attended the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. The agreed formula for normalized relations became: "independence, equality, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."[33] Later in the year (September 19-26) Miyamoto put his seal on the resumed friendship by visiting Moscow. Relations seemed repaired but the JCP remained on its guard and continued to differ with its Soviet counterpart on matters of national policy.

Although the Japanese communists had earlier "leaned" toward their Chinese comrades, relations disintegrated after 1966. Issues in dispute were the relative importance of Soviet revisionism and American imperialism and the JCP policy of seeking power through parliamentary means. Invective poured from both Yoyogi and Peking, the latter declaring "the Miyamoto clique" to be its fourth "enemy," after American imperialists, Soviet revisionists, and the Sato reactionaries. Chou En-lai bestowed the supreme insult by banning simultaneously from China Nosaka, Miyamoto, Prime Minister Sato and his brother Kishi Nobusuke.[34] During 1970 every political party in Japan, except the JCP, sent delegations to Peking. China further infuriated the JCP by giving extensive publicity, and probably material help, to an insignificant splinter group, the Japanese Communist Party (Left) which had approximately 700 members in 1972.

President Nixon's announced intention to go to China shocked the JCP even more than it did the government of Japan. The party attacked both China and the United States, the former for contributing to the "beautification" of Nixon and the latter as an architect of an aggression deceitfully aiming to divert the world attention from Indochina to China and to appear peace-loving in the process. Among Japan's political parties, only the JCP denounced the President's visit which it found questionable in motivation and dangerous in its perpetration of false illusions about "easing tensions."[35]

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[32] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[33] Hoover Institution, *YICA 1972, op. cit.*

[34] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 8, 1971.

[35] *Akahata*, February 29, 1972. The Japanese Socialist Party attacked the JCP for its criticism of the Nixon-Chou agreements. See Ito Shigeru, "The Communist Party's One-sided View of the Sino-American Joint Communique," *Shakai Shimpo*, March 8, 1972.

In a major statement in late March, Fuwa Tetsuzo, one of the party's ablest and most outstanding younger (41) leaders, concluded that Nixon won from China both tacit approval for his aggression and improved relations with China while accepting the five peace principles merely as an act of "decorative necessity." Fuwa believed Nixon had conceded nothing on Taiwan, keeping his military treaty intact, recognizing only that the *Chinese* maintain there is one China (which really means that Nixon supports "two Chinas") and making a vague, conditional, and deceptive promise about ultimate troop withdrawal which in itself permits American aggression to continue unchecked. Fuwa called the Sino-American agreement an insult and a provocation to the peoples of Asia.[36]

In spite of the break in party ties, the JCP opposed neither the establishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and Tokyo nor the entry of the PRC into the United Nations. Yoyogi suffered from this seeming contradiction and from the fact that Japan was in a "China mood," that improving Japanese-Chinese relations, especially after the Nixon-Chou meetings, was the nation's most popular foreign policy objective. To refute charges of 'isolation,' Miyamoto set out (August-September 1971) to demonstrate solidarity with like-minded comrades by visiting in succession Rumania, Italy, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, where he signed well-publicized statements and communiques pledging faith in the principles of equality, independence, and non-interference in internal affairs.

The conflict with the Chinese shows no signs of resolution nor does the JCP appear ready to give up an iota of the "independence" which is such an asset at this stage of its development. Yet the indefinite prolongation of the quarrel cannot but be harmful to the interests of both parties. At some time in the future a way of reconciliation may be found, but no such prospects appear now.

Welfare: A few years ago the communist candidate for mayor of Nikko, a city of 32,000 inhabitants 100 miles north of Tokyo, decorated the telephone poles with posters bearing photographs in brillant colors of a handsome, healthy, smiling Japanese family, well-dressed in western clothes, mother, father, son, and daughter, and with one simple message: "Lower Taxes! Lower Prices! Japanese Communist Party." The poster illustrates the urge to "get next to the people," to prove concern for the common man. JCP candidates are frequently young, attractive, well groomed, they speak little of ideology but much about everyday living and what the JCP can do for them. Public questioning of the value of sacrificing welfare for GNP fits perfectly the party's concentration on the threats to everybody's well-being: high prices, pollution, housing shortage, urban concentration, traffic congestion, and the lack of adequate social security. Communist candidates are persuasive when they explain that the ills Japanese now suffer are caused

[36] "Beichu Kyodo Seimei to Nikuson Bikaron no Shin Dankai," (The Sino-American Joint Communique and a New Stage in Arguments for the Beautification of Nixon), *Akahata*, March 25, 1972.

by wealthy industrial combinations protected by a corrupt conservative government. Once elected, communist representatives apparently show extraordinary zeal in responding to the individual complaints of their constituents; they are frequently industrious, conscientious, and actually get improvements done, repairs made, and neighborhoods cleaned up.[37]

Nationalism: The Japanese Communist Party would like to be known as a patriotic Japanese political party. Quarrels with both the Soviets and the Chinese have fortuitously demonstrated that Japan's communists owe no allegiance to foreigners and their insistence on the principles of mutual noninterference has lent credibility to the claim. Beyond independence, however, the party's nationalism is shown in many ways. Unlike the socialists, for example, the JCP does not support unarmed neutrality; it would maintain a military force should it come to power. On territorial questions the party is sometimes more nationalistic than the government itself. On two current issues, the so-called northern territories and the Senkaku Islands, the JCP takes positions opposed to those of the Soviet Union and of China.

In the dispute over the Soviet-held nothern islands (Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu) the JCP maintains that Japan did not seize them by war or aggression and that her claim over them is justified by history and by reason. Yoyogi's position is that the Soviets should return the Habomais and Shikotan when a peace treaty is signed and all of the remaining Kurile Islands after Japan has abrogated the security treaty with the United States. Since the official claim has never included the northernmost Kuriles, the communists demand more from the Russians than does the Japanese government itself. On his return from Moscow in late September 1971, Miyamoto announced that Brezhnev had promised to "give serious consideration" to the territorial question. Since the Soviets had never before admitted that a territorial issue with Japan even existed, this statement was sensational. Two weeks later Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Loginov denied the report and suggested that Miyamoto had "misunderstood" what Brezhnev said. A JCP official present at the talks then wrote in *Akahata* that the Soviet "promise to consider" was "unmistakable." Foreign Minister Gromyko, visiting Tokyo the following January, unexpectedly agreed to negotiate a peace treaty within a year; he ignored the territorial issue and the U.S.-Japan security pact. Miyamoto had probably "understood" Brezhnev after all.

A second territorial issue, which complicates Japan's relations with both Peking and Taipei, is sovereignty over the Senkaku chain, the eight tiny uninhabited islets long administered as part of the Ryukyu Islands which reverted to Japan on May 15, 1972. Counter claims to the Senkakus have arisen largely because of the reported presence of oil in their vicinity but both the PRC and the Republic of China in Taiwan insist they belong to China. On

[37]Interview with Kondo Hotoshi, journalist with *Mainichi Shimbun,* specialist on communist affairs, Tokyo, September 30, 1971. See also Kondo Hitoshi, "Nihon Kyosanto wa Nani wo Katta ka," (What Has the Japanese Communist Party Won?), *Chuo Koron,* Tokyo, June 1971.

March 30, 1972, a standing member of the Presidium of the JCP announced to the press the party's "view" on the Senkaku Islands question, citing history and international law to prove that the Senkakus belong to Japan and that Chinese claims, whether by Taiwan or Peking, are without validity.[38]

One of China's principal propaganda themes has been the revival of Japanese militarism. The Peking media have elaborated on it *ad nauseum* and Chou En-lai has expounded it repeatedly to visitors, including James Reston of the *New York Times*. Chou even inserted it as a Chinese affirmation in the Shanghai communique, issued after his talks with President Nixon. The communist party, which has consistently fought against all defense efforts in Japan, both Japanese and American, differs with Chou En-lai on the question of Japanese militarism. Springing to the defense of Japan's peace constitution, the JCP has insisted that while militaristic tendencies are evident in the country, no one can say that militarism has revived since neither conscription nor the despatch of armed forces overseas are permitted. Again, the party's nationalism inspires this qualification.

Party Achievements

Elections in 1971 for both local and national offices tested the policy of working through the parliamentary system. The united front with the JSP, so successfully used in 1970 to elect the governor of Kyoto, was continued in 1971 and produced encouraging results, especially for the JCP. Japan's two largest city-prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, would have governors elected by the JCP-JSP coalition, as would the mayors of 11 cities and 18 towns and villages. The communists, however, did better than the socialists; their seats in prefectural assemblies tripled, from 35 to 105 (out of a total of 2558) whereas socialist seats declined from 505 to 401. Only three prefectural assemblies are now without JCP members; before the April elections, communists sat in only half of them. Gains were also notable in the city and town assemblies; communists won 1,250 seats, an increase of 467 over those held previously; after the elections, only 18, instead of 97, municipal assemblies lacked JCP members.

JCP candidates for local office, selected for their ability to attract a popular following, appealed to voters under the golden symbol of "Japan's Dawn" used in Kyoto the year before, and offered a program to protect "people's life and livelihood"; construct cities and villages for good living; develop culture and education; build a peaceful homeland; and "renovate local autonomy."[39]

The unhappy socialist experience in the local elections led them to reject

[38]"Senkaku Retto wa Nihon no Ryodo," (Senkaku Islands Are Japanese Territory); "Chugoku Sho-ippa no Shutcho wa Konkyo nashi," (Claims of China and Chiang Faction Without Foundation), Press conference of Nishizawa Tomio, *Akahata*, March 31, 1972.

[39]Maeda Katsuo, "Toitsu Chuho Senkyo ni tsuite," (On the United Front and Local Elections), *Koan Joho*, Tokyo, April 1971.

a united front with the JCP to contest seats for the House of Councillors (upper house) on June 27. Although the JCP captured only six out of 250 seats, the result was double the seats and two million votes more than achieved in 1968. Of the six seats, one was won in the local and five in the national constituencies; vote percentages were 12.1% in the former (the highest in JCP history) and 8.1% in the latter. The one successful local constituency candidate was Nosaka Sanzo, now 80 years old, chairman of the Central Committee of the party, a largely honorary position, who was elected from Tokyo. The June elections brought communist-held seats in the House of Councillors up to 10, thus earning the party the right of consultation as a party group, but one short of the necessary 11 which carries the right to initiate bills. Although JCP gains were modest, all other parties lost votes compared to 1968; the communists had increased their percentages by 3.1% in the national constituencies and 3.8% in the local constituencies.

Communist votes were probably due in large degree to deep dissatisfaction with both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the badly split JSP. Many voters, neither party members nor even convinced sympathizers, also chose JCP candidates because they found their bright, earnest appeals refreshing and beguiling and their professed concern for welfare convincing. The JCP vote was both a vote of protest and a vote of trial support.

The greatest communist strength continued to be in urban areas, in the smog-choked industrial belt extending from Tokyo almost uninterruptedly to Osaka, in cities with higher pollution density and in those situated near military bases. Support for the party also rose, however, in the countryside where elected communist officials had been almost unknown before. For example, as compared to previous local elections, the JCP vote quadrupled in Kagoshima prefecture, tripled in Oita, and almost doubled in Saga and Miyazaki.

Party leaders realized that success over the long term must depend not on a disaffected floating vote which could rapidly shift with the times but on a solid base of party membership. But this had actually declined after the 1970 Congress, due partly to resignations of disillusioned members and partly to numerous expulsions carried out by strict, and in the later view of the leadership itself, over-zealous application of party rules. Although more than 20,000 new recruits were admitted to the party during the 18 months subsequent to the Eleventh Congress, some 34,000 members were expelled during the first 12 months of this same period. From October through November 1971 some 4,000 new members joined the JCP but 3,500 were stricken from the rolls. The motive was often a minor infraction of party rules and local branches were apparently unusually strict in administering party discipline. The circulation of the daily newspaper *Akahata* dropped after July 1970 and had only returned to that figure (420,000) by the beginning of 1972.[40]

[40]Statistics from Koan-cho (Public Safety Investigation Administration), Tokyo.

Because of the loss of membership, the expected lower house elections, the fiftieth anniversay, and the next Congress in 1973, the JCP decided in 1971 to launch a vigorous campaign to build up the party. The goals, which seemed unrealistic in view of recent trends and the short time ahead, were set for achievement by the Twelfth Congress in 1973: 500,000 members (280,000 in 1972) and an *Akahata* circulation of 700,000 daily (420,000 in 1972) and 2,500,000 on Sunday (1,620,00 in 1972).[41] The Central Committee ordered studies of why members resign and why they are expelled, prohibited ousters for "trivial" reasons and set up review procedures. The Committee designated "target" groups for membership drives and planned the expansion of educational and cultural activities.

The Future of the Japanese Communist Party

While few Japanese conservative politicians take the Communist Party seriously as a contender for political power, they are concerned over its rapid development and over the amazing popular appeal which its leaders and its policies have been able to generate. They believe its growth potentialities are limited and that while further election gains will inevitably come, the JCP will after a few more years of its "parliamentary struggle" reach a plateau beyond which it will be difficult to advance. The question in their minds is: what will the JCP do then? Will it be content to continue as a bourgeois-type political party seeking power through elections or will it shift to the militancy of the past and again promote the "violent revolution," the very language of which today it publicly rejects?

First we must put in perspective the present position the Japanese Communist Party occupies in Japan's political spectrum. Its 14 seats out of the 486 in the House of Representatives are still but a token representation. Should the party win in the coming elections the maximum 40 projected (a decidedly optimistic goal), this would be less than 10% and would place the JCP between the present strength of the two so-called "middle-of-the-road" parties, the Democratic Socialists (31) and the Komeito (47). Regardless of the energy put into the expansion campaign, the communist vote in the next election will doubtless originate far more with those who are dissatisfied and disenchanted with LDP rule and JSP confusion than from the ranks of JCP faithful. Should the LDP renovate its policies and its personnel, presenting a new face to the public, and should the JSP improve its unity and its power to attract, the JCP would be the most serious loser.

The crisis for the Japanese Communist Party may come some years from now. A new generation of leaders may chafe at the non-violent acceptance of majority rule with the first stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution lengthening interminably. Nosaka did not expect the socialist revolution to come in his lifetime, but future leaders may not be so patient; they may find it too frustrating to reconcile themselves to an indefinite wait for power.

[41] *Ibid.*

Thus circumstances could at some point dictate the non-peaceful revolution which Miyamoto himself had admitted is possible. On the other hand, the destiny of the party will be shaped to a great extent by the destiny of Japan. It is therefore more likely that, in a Japan assuming more significant international responsibilities and facing more complex situations at home and abroad, the Japanese Communist Party will see prospects of eventual participation in a coalition government and will therefore continue for the foreseeable future to follow its present line.

JOHN K, EMMERSON, Foreign Service Officer, Retired, is Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California.