DERADICALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER KENJI MIYAMOTO

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I

UNQUESTIONABLY, one of the major developments in recent Japanese politics is the emergence of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) as the second-largest parliamentary opposition party. In the general elections of 1972, it captured 38 seats (40 when one includes a "progressive independent" and an Okinawan deputy who later joined the party) in the lower house of the Diet, polling nearly 5.5 million (or 10.5 per cent) of the total votes cast. (See Table I.) In the elections for the upper house of the Diet on July 7, 1974, the JCP increased its seats from 11 to 20, polling over 6.4 million (or 12 per cent) of the total votes cast in the local constituencies and over 4.9 million (or 9.4 per cent) of the votes cast in the national constituency.[1]

The party's impressive electoral record in the recent parliamentary elections necessitates an explanation of the underlying causes, for the JCP's growth clearly deviates from some of the theories advanced by well-known scholars in the field of comparative politics. For example, the rapid expansion and steady growth of the JCP's organizational strength (the party membership) clearly deviates from the hypothesis formulated by Seymour Martin Lipset on the inverse correlation between economic growth (per capita income) and the strength of Communist parties.[2] The JCP's organizational strength increased sharply—instead of decreasing—during a period of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity in Japan (1961–74). Nor does the JCP's steady increase in its electoral strength (from 1,157,000 in 1960 to 5,479,000 in 1972) conform to the "curvilinear theory" introduced more recently by Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, who hypothesized that the strength of Communist parties decreases sharply in highly industrialized and technologically advanced countries like Japan.[3] A

[1] *Asahi Shimbun*, July 9, 1974, evening ed.

[2] Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1959), 62.

[3] Benjamin and Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (March 1968), 110-21, esp. 117.

plausible explanation for the JCP's deviation from these theories should be sought not in economic variables but in other factors.

It is my basic contention that the recent growth in the JCP's organizational strength and electoral successes should be ascribed to the overall deradicalization of the Japanese Communist movement which has taken place under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto since 1961. The term "deradicalization," as used in this study, means essentially making an "accommodation to the world as it stands,"[4] instead of seeking the "ideal order" through violent means. More specifically, it means the transformation of a revolutionary party into an electoral party that seeks power largely through the parliamentary process.

The findings of this study as a whole substantiate theories on deradicalization of the Marxist movement advanced earlier by Robert Michels and more recently by Robert C. Tucker. According to Tucker, deradicalization of the Marxist movement is caused largely by two important factors, namely, "leadership change and worldly success." Tucker has also hypothesized that there is "an inverse relation between a radical movement's organizational strength and the preservation of its radicalism."[5] A somewhat similar thesis was advanced by Robert Michels, in his study of the European Marxist parties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[6] His findings also confirm Triska's and Finley's hypothesis that, as the Communist parties become electoral parties in the developed countries, "the competition [with other parties for votes] forces them to reduce greatly, both structurally and functionally, their differences from other parties. They therefore tend to be pragmatic, nonheretic, and nonideological, and their ties and interaction with the Communist system tend to slacken."[7]

II

As the deradicalization of the JCP is closely related to Miyamoto's leadership of the party, it is necessary to review briefly the developments leading to the establishment of the "Miyamoto system."

Immediately following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the JCP was reorganized under the leadership of Kyūichi Tokuda and Sanzō Nosaka. Under Nosaka's famous "peaceful path to revolution" the JCP expanded its power base rapidly between 1946 and 1949. In

[4] For the definition of deradicalization, see Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61 (June 1967), 348.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Dover Publications 1959), 370-73, esp. 373.
[7] Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan 1968), 191.

1949, for instance, the party succeeded in electing 35 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling nearly three million votes (or 9.7 per cent of the total votes cast). The JCP's triumph of 1949 did not last long, however. With the adoption, in 1950–51, of a new strategy of militancy and outright violence under instructions from Moscow and Peking (commonly known as the 1951 "Thesis"), the JCP lost all of its 35 seats in the 1952 elections, and its popular vote plummeted to 897,000 in 1952.[8] (See Table II.)

Following orders from Moscow and Peking, the JCP had attempted to organize a guerilla force in Japan and to train its members in subversive activities and terrorism. However, the violent revolutionary strategy proved disastrous, for it provoked United States military authorities in Japan to retaliate with measures designed to curb the JCP's activities after June 1950. The Japanese Communists were purged from public office and many of them, including Tokuda, went underground or into exile in Communist China during the period of the Korean War, 1950–53. The sporadic terrorist activities of the JCP alienated it from the masses, and the party rapidly became a symbol of extremism. Not only did the JCP's electoral support dwindle: its membership shrank drastically, from 150,000 in 1949 to about 20,000 by 1955. (See Table III.)

In the wake of the disaster created by the "ultra-leftist adventurism" of 1951–55, Kenji Miyamoto was to emerge as a leader of the JCP to rebuild the party. To be sure, Miyamoto had impressive credentials as a party leader. He had been a member of the JCP's Politburo as early as 1933. After twelve years' imprisonment (1933–45), Miyamoto emerged from prison as one of the most respected leaders of the party.[9] He had been overshadowed, however, by the more "bossy" Kyūichi Tokuda (who died in China in 1953), and the popular Sanzō Nosaka, who had shaped the party line from 1946 to 1949.

Miyamoto challenged the leadership of the Mainstream faction in 1950, when the Cominform attacked Nosaka's peaceful approach to the revolution. Siding openly with the Cominform, Miyamoto's faction (i.e., the International faction) demanded "self-criticism" of the leadership of the Mainstream faction, as well as the acceptance of the Comin-

[8] Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1966), 72. See also Kōken Koyama, *Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō shi* (Tokyo: Yoshiga Shoten 1970), 60 and 151. In the 1953 general elections, the JCP's votes shrank further to 650,000. See Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Ikko-sha 1973), 190.

[9] *Ibid.*, 44-45. Graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1931, Miyamoto joined the JCP in the same year and became a member of the party's Politburo and Secretariat in 1933.

form's directives, alienating him from the party leadership. When the Mainstream leaders went underground in 1950, Miyamoto founded a separate party organization.[10] However, this group was not recognized as a legitimate party organization by the Cominform, which increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of the JCP at this time. In 1951, Miyamoto's group was dissolved under pressure from Moscow and Peking, and Miyamoto was to remain largely inactive until 1954.[11]

By 1955, it became apparent to the JCP leaders that there was an urgent need for consolidation of their disrupted organization and also for a re-evaluation of the revolutionary strategy. Through a compromise worked out between Shigeo Shida, the strong man of the Mainstream faction, and Miyamoto, the two rival groups merged in the spring of 1955. Sanzō Nosaka became First Secretary of the party and headed a new leadership group which included Kenji Miyamoto and Shigeo Shida. The JCP also decided to do away with the defunct strategy of violent revolution and to map out a new strategy.

Miyamoto's emergence as the party's Secretary-General at the 7th Party Congress in 1958 may be attributed partly to his noninvolvement in the formulation of the party's militant strategy from 1951 to 1954, and partly to the fortuitous circumstances involving the downfall of Shigeo Shida who had been the real power in the JCP during 1951–55. The erstwhile leader of the Mainstream faction was expelled from the party as it became clear that he had misused party funds and abused his power.[12]

At the 7th Party Congress, Miyamoto was still overshadowed by the Party Chairman, Sanzō Nosaka, in terms of prestige and popularity. After that, he began to build up his power base within the party, but it was not until 1966 that he became the undisputed leader of the JCP. During the intervening eight years, Miyamoto had to wage a series of struggles against his opponents within the JCP and with their mentors in Moscow and Peking.

The first serious challenge to the Miyamoto leadership was posed by

[10] In September 1950, Miyamoto organized the National Unity Committee, which was dissolved the next month. As many of Miyamoto's followers were purged by the Mainstream faction instead of being allowed to rejoin the party, Miyamoto and other leaders of the International Faction established, in December 1950, another organization, the "JCP National Unity Conference," to fight the leaders of the Mainstream faction. Its followers numbered approximately 10,000. For details, see Shigetaro Iizuka, *Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Sekka-sha 1969), 45-50. See also Koyama (fn. 8), 86-129.

[11] Iizuka (fn. 10), 54. See also Kōtaro Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo Shuppanbu 1972), 287-91.

[12] Shida disappeared in December 1955, after being investigated about his misuse of party funds during 1951-55. He was officially expelled from the party in 1956. See Koyama (fn. 8), 194-96.

a group headed by Shōjiro Kasuga, a party veteran who was closely identified with Moscow. This group openly opposed a new party program that had been drafted and presented by Miyamoto. They argued against its adoption largely on the basis of the "structural reform theory,"[13] originally advanced by Togliatti in Italy, contending that Japan was an independent, "advanced capitalist country" which was ready to proceed to the "socialist revolution" like Italy and other Western European countries through peaceful parliamentary means. Since nearly one-third of the delegates were opposed to Miyamoto's draft program, a temporary action program was adopted, pending further discussion.

After the inconclusive 7th Party Congress, the new party leadership made the Kasuga group its central target and prepared itself for the final showdown, which took place in the spring of 1961. At the party's Central Committee meeting, Miyamoto succeeded in overcoming the Kasuga group's opposition and secured the committee's endorsement for the adoption of his draft program.[14] Shortly thereafter, the leaders of the Kasuga faction withdrew from the JCP.

At the 8th Party Congress, in July of 1961, the Kasuga group was officially ousted from the party, and there was little opposition to the new party program presented to the Congress by Miyamoto. With the departure of the Kasuga faction, Miyamoto's power position was immensely improved. Re-elected as the party's Secretary-General, Miyamoto gradually overshadowed the power of the Party Chairman, Sanzō Nosaka. According to the newly adopted party program, the JCP was to pursue the basic strategy of the parliamentary path to revolution instead of the strategy of violent revolution.[15] However, unlike Kasuga's proposal, the program did not preclude the possibility of violent revolution. Nor did it abandon the model of a two-stage revolution.

On the basis of the newly adopted party program, Miyamoto made strenuous efforts to rebuild the JCP after 1961. The task was complicated by the conflicting pressures exerted by Moscow and Peking, as the two Communist giants attempted to pull the JCP into their respective orbits as a part of their growing contest for the leadership of the world Communist movement.

Against the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, the JCP sought to steer a course of neutrality by playing down the ideological differences between the two camps. In 1961 it became obvious, however, that despite the

[13] Scalapino (fn. 8), 102-3. [14] *Ibid.*, 109.

[15] *Ibid.*, 113. For a Japanese text of the party program, see Asahi Shimbun sha, ed., *Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha 1973), 296-310.

JCP's superficially neutral and conciliatory attitudes toward both Moscow and Peking, it was leaning increasingly toward Peking. In 1962 and early 1963, criticisms of Khrushchev's ideological and policy positions began to emanate from Yoyogi (the location of the JCP's headquarters in Tokyo). By fall of 1963, they became more pronounced.[16]

The Soviet Union's signing of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty in July of 1963 marked the beginning of the JCP's more outspoken criticism of the Soviet position. In October 1963, for example, the JCP criticized the Soviet line as "modern revisionism," and hardened its opposition to Moscow. Against this background, talks were held in Moscow between the JCP delegation and Soviet leaders in March 1964 in a futile attempt to iron out the differences between the two parties. Yoyogi's rupture with Moscow came shortly thereafter, when the pro-Moscow Diet members of the JCP, Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled from the party after voting for the ratification of the nuclear test-ban treaty in violation of party discipline. Moscow denounced the JCP's action and, in an attempt to discredit the JCP leadership, revealed hitherto unpublished letters exchanged between Moscow and Yoyogi during 1963–64. Yoyogi responded to the Soviet action by purging most of the pro-Soviet members from the party by fall of 1964.[17] The purged members in turn, and with Moscow's blessing, organized a group called "The Voice of Japan." It was not until 1971 that relations between the two parties were "normalized" on the basis of "independence, equality and non-interference."[18] In the meantime, the JCP denounced the Soviet Union for its numerous sins and "big-power chauvinism," including the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

[16] See Koyama (fn. 8), 303-5. Within the JCP, there were three different factions, one supporting the Chinese Communist Party, another supporting the Soviet Union, and the third supporting a position of neutrality while leaning toward Peking.

[17] According to Koyama, several hundred party members left the JCP together with the pro-Soviet leaders (Shiga, Suzuki, Shigeo Kamiyama, etc.). See Koyama (fn. 8), 342-70. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 231-32.

[18] An attempt to normalize the JCP's relations with Moscow was made in the early part of 1968, when Miyamoto met in Tokyo with the Soviet delegation headed by Mikhail Suslov. A joint communiqué was issued on February 7, 1968, pledging both parties' efforts to normalize their relations on the basis of "autonomy, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other party." The JCP demanded that Soviet leaders not support Yoshio Shiga. The JCP's relationship with Moscow deteriorated in summer of 1968, when the Japanese Communists denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, calling the Soviet Union the "aggressor." Yoyogi-Moscow relations improved somewhat after Miyamoto's meeting with Brezhnev at Moscow in September 1971, at which both leaders reaffirmed their adherence to the principle of "autonomy, equality, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs." However, it is not as warm as it used to be in the 1950's. See *ibid.*, 125-31.

Even more serious than the Soviet challenge to Miyamoto's leadership were the attempts by the Chinese Communist Party, starting in 1966, to impose its will upon the JCP. It was widely assumed at the time of the expulsion of the pro-Soviet elements from the JCP in 1964 that the party had drifted toward Peking's orbit.[19] However, Miyamoto apparently had reservations about embracing Peking's militant strategy —especially in the wake of the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party after the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, which was believed to have been undertaken with Peking's blessings. As a result, when the Chinese Communists attempted to dictate militant policies to the JCP, a rupture between Yoyogi and Peking developed during Miyamoto's visit to Peking in March of 1966, largely due to the inability to find common ground with Mao on two basic issues:[20] (1) the problem of promoting Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam; and (2) the proper revolutionary strategy to be adopted by the Japanese Communists. Mao ruled out the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union in Vietnam and did not endorse the JCP's parliamentary path to revolution, but advocated the development of armed struggles in Japan. When Miyamoto did not give in to the Chinese demands, Mao refused to issue the joint communiqué previously agreed upon by both sides. After this incident, according to Miyamoto, the Chinese Communists mobilized their resources to overthrow his leadership.

Upon his return from Peking, Miyamoto carried out purges against the pro-Peking elements. Before the opening of the 10th Party Congress in October in 1966, some 40 prominent pro-Peking members were expelled from the party, including Ryūji Nishizawa (the late Tokuda's son-in-law) and Kuraji Anzai (former chief of the party's personnel section). The pro-Peking elements in turn organized splinter groups, challenging the authority of Miyamoto's leadership. The Peking regime provided all-out support for these elements.[21] As the conflict between Yoyogi and Peking intensified, invectives flew from both directions: the JCP denounced the "Maoist Clique" for its "anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist behavior," including the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese

[19] J. A. A. Stockwin, "The Japanese Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet Dispute—From Neutrality to Alignment?" in D. B. Miller and T. H. Rigby, eds., *The Disintegrating Monolith* (Canberra: Australian National University Press 1965), 142-43. See also Robert A. Scalapino, "Japan," in Witold S. Sworakowski, ed., *World Communism: A Handbook 1918–1965* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1973), 245; Kyosuke Hirotsu, "The Strategic Triangle: Japan," in Leopold Labedz, ed., *International Communism After Khrushchev* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1965), 123-30.

[20] Iizuka (fn. 8), 116-24; Tawara (fn. 11), 242-46; Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 213-17.

[21] *Ibid.*, 218-25.

Communists retaliated by labeling the "Miyamoto revisionist clique" one of China's "four arch-enemies," after American "imperialism," Soviet "revisionism," and the Sato "reactionaries."[22] The JCP's conflict with Peking has not shown any sign of resolution since 1966.

With the elimination of the pro-Soviet and pro-Peking elements from the party, Miyamoto became the undisputed leader of the JCP. At the 10th Party Congress, he was not only re-elected Secretary-General, but his trusted lieutenants were placed in key positions at the top echelon of the party hierarchy. The Congress also reaffirmed the JCP's policy of "self-reliance and independence" in its dealings with other Communist parties abroad.

Miyamoto's bold policy of defiance toward Moscow and Peking in a sense reflected his growing confidence in the JCP's ability to stand on its own feet without requiring assistance from abroad. By the fall of 1966, the JCP's membership had increased spectacularly from somewhat over 30,000 in 1958 to over 250,000. The combined circulation of the party organ, *Akahata*, more than tripled, from 300,000 in 1961 to over one million in 1966. (See Table IV.)

The loss of a few thousand members therefore did not weaken the JCP's defiant attitudes and policies toward Peking and Moscow; these policies undoubtedly strengthened its claim to being an independent, national Japanese party.[23] With the severance of its ties with Moscow in 1964 and especially with Peking in 1966, the JCP veered away from the Chinese model of revolution, identifying itself more closely with the European Communist parties and advocating the parliamentary path to revolution.

III

One of the most important consequences of the JCP's severance of ties with Moscow and Peking was the liberation of the party from foreign domination. For the first time since the establishment of the party in 1922, the JCP's leadership became free to map out its own strategy, unhindered by Chinese or Soviet interference. It declared its intention to pursue an independent course of action by "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" to the political problems in Japan. Such an independent posture eventually led the Miyamoto leadership

[22] *Ibid.*; see also Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1972), 74. For more detailed information on Yoyogi-Peking relations from 1966 to 1973, see Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* [hereafter referred to as *Yearbook*] (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1966 to 1974). Each volume carries a section on Japan.

[23] Tawara (fn. 11), 79, 246.

to turn away further from the Chinese model of revolution and embrace the parliamentary path to revolution.

To be sure, the JCP had already experimented successfully with the parliamentary strategy under the leadership of Sanzō Nosaka during 1946–49; and following the disasters wrought by the violent revolutionary strategy of 1950–55, the Central Committee of the JCP had agreed, as early as June of 1956, to consider a new program for "peaceful parliamentary revolution," because the 1951 "Thesis" did not fit the situation in Japan.[24] It was not until 1961 that the JCP's decision to explore the possibility of seeking power by a parliamentary path was laid down officially in the new party program adopted by the 8th Party Congress. In this document,[25] the JCP acknowledged that Japan was a highly developed capitalist country, but dependent on the United States. Accordingly, the Japanese Communists must wage a struggle against the two principal enemies, "U.S. imperialism" and "Japanese monopoly capitalism," by carrying out a people's democratic revolution. With the completion of this phase of the revolution, it should proceed toward the "socialist revolution." The first phase of the revolution was to be carried out by a JCP-led multiclass "national democratic united front." As for revolutionary strategy and tactics, the party program stipulated that the Communist-led united front should seek to capture as many parliamentary seats as possible. "If a majority of seats could be won, then the parliament could be transformed from a tool of reaction to an instrument of the people."[26] As Scalapino has pointed out, "To commit the party to electoral contests, however, did not imply sanction for a 'parliamentary, peaceful revolution' "; it simply meant that "the parliamentary system should be used to further the course of the revolution."[27] To be sure, the JCP did not rule out the possibility of "non-peaceful" revolution, although the party played it down gradually after the 8th Party Congress. Undoubtedly, the 1961 "Thesis" was a product of compromise among the party leaders, for it retained the Chinese model of two-stage revolution while recognizing the possibility of the peaceful parliamentary approach to revolution.

The adoption of the 1961 "Thesis" notwithstanding, it was not until after the break with Peking in 1966 that the JCP became really serious about the "parliamentary path to revolution."[28] During the intervening

[24] As early as June 28-30, 1956, the Central Committee of the JCP acknowledged the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism" in Japan and decided to revise the 1951 "Thesis." For details, see Scalapino (fn. 8), 100. See also Koyama (fn. 8), 207.

[25] For a Japanese text of the party program, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 296-310.

[26] *Ibid.*, 308.

[27] Scalapino (fn. 8), 113.

[28] Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 251.

years (1961–66) the Chinese influence was still substantial within the JCP,[29] and the JCP was more concerned with the "struggles" against the United States.

After 1966, the JCP's justification for the "parliamentary path to revolution" took the form of rejecting the violent revolution advocated by the Chinese Communists on the grounds that (1) Japan is a highly "advanced capitalist country," comparable to the Western European countries; (2) accordingly, the peaceful transition to revolution is as feasible in Japan as in the Western European countries. According to Tetsuzo Fuwa, who has articulated the JCP's viewpoints on the parliamentary path to revolution, the Communist revolution in the highly industrialized countries should not have to be violent but could be peaceful and nonviolent.[30] The "peaceful transition to people's democracy" is possible in Japan, according to Fuwa, because Japan's liberal democratic political system provides such a possibility. Specifically, Fuwa points out that the Japanese Diet enjoys substantial constitutional powers within the Japanese state apparatus and plays a pivotal role in the operation of the Japanese government. Consequently, if a majority of the Diet seats could be captured, it would be possible for the JCP-led united front to form a new government, which could transform the existing Diet into a "People's Democratic Parliament." In Fuwa's theory of "people's parliamentarism," one can detect the basic ingredients of the doctrine of "peaceful transition" to revolution which has been widely advocated by the European and Soviet Communists since the late 1950's, if not earlier.[31] Fuwa's theory also echoes the struc-

[29] According to Hirotsu, altogether some 1,500 Japanese Communists went to China between 1953 and 1957; many of them returned home in the spring of 1958. These returnees from China came to form the nucleus of the pro-Chinese faction within the JCP. At the 8th Party Congress, the pro-Chinese faction "monopolized the important positions at the party centre," and "the strength of Secretary-General Miyamoto's faction, which was said to be neutral, declined." The pro-Chinese leaders were believed to have received abundant Chinese financial aid and to control the JCP's organization department, the financial committee, and the *Akahata* editorial board in the early part of the 1960's. See Hirotsu (fn. 19), 128-29; see also Stockwin (fn. 19).

[30] See Fuwa, *Jinmjn teki Gikaishugi* (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppan sha 1970). See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 153-56.

[31] According to Cyril E. Black, "in discussing the prospects for revolution in the years ahead, Soviet doctrine places almost exclusive emphasis on 'peaceful transition to socialism' which it defines as the *'transition of individual countries to socialism without an armed rising and civil war.'*" (Italics in original). The Soviet conception of "peaceful transition" is not, according to Black, necessarily peaceful in the same sense as the transfer of power in a democratic system is peaceful, "but may involve threat of violence and readiness to use violent methods in the event of unforeseen opposition." That is why Soviet writings distinguish the theory of "peaceful transition" from the heresy of the "revisionists" or "reformists," which denies the necessity for "class struggle" and precludes the "possibility of non-peaceful revolution." For details, see "The Anticipation of Communist Revolutions," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton,

tural reform theory advocated earlier by the Kasuga group. However, a closer examination of Fuwa's theory reveals that it is different from Kasuga's in at least three respects. First, unlike the Kasuga group which classified Japan as a fully developed, independent, capitalist country ready for immediate socialist revolution, Fuwa still adheres to the basic dogma laid down in the 1961 party program that the first stage of the democratic revolution is not yet completed in Japan. Second, as a corollary, Fuwa maintains—unlike the Kasuga group which held that the JCP should focus its attention primarily on capitalism at home—that United States "imperialism" is the principal enemy of the JCP, and "Japanese monopoly capitalism" is its secondary enemy.[32] Finally, unlike the structural reform theory of the Kasuga group, Fuwa's theory of peaceful transition to revolution does not preclude the possibility of non-peaceful revolution.

Theoretical considerations aside, the Miyamoto leadership had other reasons to be willing to commit the JCP to parliamentary politics. With its streamlined party organization of over 250,000 members and a widely circulated party organ, the JCP had succeeded in electing 14 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling over 3.1 million votes in the December 1969 elections. These "worldly successes" reinforced the JCP leadership's commitment to parliamentary politics.

IV

In the aftermath of the JCP's decision to seek power through parliamentary means, it became unmistakably clear to the leadership that without an increase in the party's electoral strength it would be unrealistic to expect any success in the implementation of the "peaceful transition to revolution."[33] In order to increase the JCP's electoral strength, however, drastic changes were needed to improve the party's image with the voters, to streamline the party's operations for "electioneering,"

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eds., *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964), 438-39. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Advanced Countries," *ibid.*, 407-9.

[32] According to a resolution adopted by the 11th Party Congress, held in July, 1970, the JCP maintained that "Under the San Francisco system [i.e., the system established by the San Francisco Peace Treaty] it continues to be a semi-occupied, semi-independent country chained to the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression. It is, as the party program puts it, a country which is "virtually dependent, being semi-occupied by American imperialism." See Paul Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism*, XX (January-April 1971), 18. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 146-50.

[33] For a detailed analysis of the problem of adaptation for the deradicalized, non-ruling Communist parties, see Thomas H. Greene, "Non-Ruling Communist Parties and Political Adaptation," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VI (Winter 1973), 331-61.

and to adjust the party's political style and behavior to that befitting an electoral party. As a result, deradicalization of the JCP has been effected in virtually every aspect of the party's activities in recent years.

First, under Miyamoto's leadership the JCP has made systematic efforts to divest itself of the taint of violence and to create a democratic new image; without this change it would have been difficult for the JCP to appeal for votes to a Japanese electorate which is largely conservative and hostile to communism—a force that has long been associated with violence, dictatorship, and subservience to Moscow and Peking. At the 11th Party Congress in 1970, for instance, the sessions of the Congress, with the exception of those related to finances and personnel, were open to the press and the public for the first time in history. Furthermore, the resolution adopted by the Congress pledged the party not to institute a one-party dictatorship even if the JCP came into power, but rather to permit the functioning of opposition parties "so long as they did not attempt to destroy the democratic system by violence."[34] In addition, the party rules were amended to define Marxism-Leninism as the party's "theoretical basis" instead of its "principle for action."[35] To allay the fears and suspicions of the non-Communist parties, the JCP has since 1970 been painstakingly toning down the traditional Communist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

While the JCP's attempts at constructing a democratic image have been less than successful, its disclaimer of violence has become more credible to the public in recent years. During the height of the campus revolts in 1968 and 1969, the JCP-affiliated students frequently helped police to quell disorders staged by the more radical "anti-Yoyogi" *Zengakuren* elements.[36] The JCP also vehemently denounced the extremist groups, such as the *Sekigun* (Red Army) faction which hijacked a Japanese airliner to North Korea in 1970 and the *Rengo Sekigun* (United Red Army) faction which shocked the Japanese through atrocities committed against its own members in the form of torture and mass murders in early 1972.[37]

As a part of the overall campaign for the improvement of its image,

[34] Tawara (fn. 11), 51. See also *Yearbook 1971* (fn. 22), 598.

[35] For a detailed analysis of the revised party bylaws, see Iizuka (fn. 8), 162-68. For a complete text of the party rules, see *Akahata*, July 6, 1970.

[36] For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the JCP and radical extremist "anti-Yoyogi" elements, see Tawara (fn. 11), 127-38. See also Ichiro Sunada, "The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement," *Asian Survey*, IX (June 1969), 457-74.

[37] John K. Emmerson, "The Japanese Communist Party After Fifty Years," *Asian Survey*, XII (July 1972), 571-72.

the JCP has also emphasized its claim to being an independent, national Japanese party. By denouncing the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as well as Mao's Cultural Revolution in China, the JCP attempted to demonstrate its defiant attitudes toward Moscow and Peking. And by advocating the return of the Kurile Islands from the Soviet Union, and defending Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku Islands against Chinese claims, the JCP has projected a new image as a nationalistic Japanese party.[38]

Second, concurrent with its assiduous attempts to improve the JCP's image, the Miyamoto leadership has engaged in systematic efforts to deradicalize its political communications. The JCP's "soft line" was reflected particularly in the editorial policy of *Akahata*.[39] Until the mid-1960's, the party organ had been of little interest to non-Communist readers because of its heavy use of Communist jargon and radical editorials. In 1968, however, the JCP leadership drastically changed the format of the paper by diversifying its sources of information and introducing an entertainment section that features comics, interviews with show-business celebrities, chess and *go* games, and the like.[40] The deradicalization of *Akahata* has made it one of the most widely circulated party-operated newspapers in Japan. By 1974 it had a combined circulation of 3 million (650,000 in daily and 2,350,000 in Sunday editions). The JCP's success in expanding *Akahata*'s circulation not only strengthened the party's propaganda apparatus, but also increased its income by more than $10 million per annum since 1971, or 70 per cent.[41]

In 1971 the JCP leadership also introduced a systematic campaign to change some of the Communist jargon which conveyed radical or undemocratic connotations. The word "cell" (*saibō*) was replaced by "branch" (*shibu*). Miyamoto also announced his intention to substitute

[38] *Ibid.*, 575.

[39] For an excellent analysis of *Akahata*'s success, see Hisamatsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodan sha 1973).

[40] *Ibid.*, 89-106. According to *Asahi Shimbun*, more than 300 full-time employees are working for *Akahata* at the JCP headquarters in Tokyo. In addition, there are over 12,600 local correspondents (unpaid), and about 21,000 delivery workers who render services on a voluntary basis with little or no compensation. For details, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 71-72. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 209-11.

[41] According to the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, the JCP raised 4,341 million yen (or about $12 million) in 1971. Approximately 95% of the income was generated through the sales of publications. See George O. Totten, "The People's Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party, Part II: Local Level Tactics," *Pacific Affairs*, XLVI (Fall 1973), 398-99. According to its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the JCP's income for the first half of 1972 was 2,195 million yen (or about $8 million), which exceeded the officially reported amount of the LDP's income for the same period. 74% of the reported income was generated from sales of *Akahata*. See Iizuka (fn. 8), 214-15.

the less shocking "administration of the proletariat" (*puroretaria shikken*) for "dictatorship of the proletariat" (*puroretaria dokusai*), and went so far as to replace "violent revolution" (*bōryoku kakumei*) with the less provocative "revolution by coercive force" (*kyōseiryoku kakumei*).[42] Most of this new jargon was adopted officially by the 12th Party Congress in revising the JCP's bylaws. To be sure, despite Miyamoto's juggling with the Communist jargon, the JCP has not succeeded in its attempts to allay the non-Communist parties' persistent suspicion and fear as to its ultimate intentions. This failure can be attributed partly to its refusal to discard Communist dogma and partly to its unconventional manner of operation which is still shrouded in a veil of secrecy.[43]

Third, since 1966 there have been drastic changes in the JCP's approach to elections. As the JCP became serious about the parliamentary path to revolution, it began to focus more attention on the bread-and-butter issues that often determine the outcome of elections, rather than on the foreign policy issues. Thus, while down-grading the revolutionary theme in its policy statements, the party has focused its attention increasingly on the mundane but politically potent issues of pollution, taxation, inflation, and public health.[44] Furthermore, to garner votes the JCP and its front organizations have also made all-out efforts to organize grassroots activities, such as bowling, table-tennis games, and other sports and entertainments. They also maintain consulting facilities to advise and help the voters in their common daily problems by providing tax counseling, medical service, and the like.[45]

Akahata has been especially important in building channels of communication between the JCP and the alienated voters dwelling in urban areas. Frequently, the Japanese Communists have combined solicitation for subscriptions to *Akahata* with the canvassing of voters.[46] No sooner does a voter subscribe to the newspaper than he begins to be fed the

[42] *Ibid.*, 169-76.

[43] Unlike the lively conventions of the non-Communist parties, for instance, the JCP conventions are staged so as not to permit any serious debate among the delegates. Every aspect of the proceedings is tightly controlled by the party leadership, whose proposals are ritualistically endorsed by the delegates. For the highly unconventional atmosphere of the 12th Party Congress, held in November 1973, see Taro Akasaka, "Kumori Garasu no Kyōsantō Daikai," *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 52 (January 1974), 184-88; Takuro Suzuki, "Kyōsantō 12-kai Daikai o Kaibō suru," *Jiyū*, XVI (January 1974), 81-90.

[44] For a summary of the JCP's most recently announced policy program, May 1974, see *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 21, 1974.

[45] For an excellent analysis of the JCP's grassroots activities, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 97-137. See also Totten (fn. 41), 384-406; Karl Dixon, "The Growth of a 'Popular' Japanese Communist Party," *Pacific Affairs*, XLV (Fall 1972), 387-402.

[46] Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 61-62, 74. See also Nagada (fn. 39), 26-28.

party's viewpoints on policy matters as well as favorable information regarding its candidates for public office.

Parallel with the stepped-up activities geared to electioneering, the JCP has also introduced changes in its approach to the nominations of party candidates. The party's nomination of candidates in national elections is now more frequently given to party members who have "voter appeal." Accordingly, physicians, lawyers, and other professionals with moderate and respectable images tend to receive the endorsement of the party more frequently than others.[47] Emphasis has also been placed on projecting a youthful, dynamic image of the party in nominating candidates for public office.

Once elected, the Communist representatives endeavor to be responsive to the individual complaints of their constituents, and to try to establish their reputations as effective representatives. Furthermore, there has been a significant change in the voting behavior of Communist members of the Diet. (See Table VI.) Instead of opposing government bills for the sake of opposition, the Communist deputies have frequently voted for the measures proposed by the government party. During the special session of the Diet in 1971, for instance, the Communist deputies voted more frequently for government-proposed bills than against them (i.e., seven times for to five times against); in 1972 they even voted for the government-proposed measures for the control of Molotov cocktails (privately manufactured bottle grenades).[48]

These efforts have not only changed the stereotype image of the JCP,[49] but have made the party more attractive to voters dissatisfied with the government party. As a result, JCP representation has steadily increased in the various legislative assemblies. In the Diet, the JCP's representation increased from 4 seats in 1960 to 59 in 1974 in both houses. The Communists have also increased their legislative seats in various

[47] Of 38 Communists elected to the lower house in December 1972, 12 were lawyers, 2 were medical doctors, 6 were teachers, and 4 were leaders of Communist-controlled local businessmen's associations. The remaining 14 were either labor union leaders or party "bureaucrats." For the backgrounds of the 38 deputies, see *ibid.*, 70-73. See also Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 146-47.

[48] For a detailed analysis of the JCP deputies' voting record from 1967 to 1972, see Tawara (fn. 11), 63-65.

[49] According to a recent opinion survey conducted by *Asahi Shimbun*, 19% of the people surveyed indicated a generally favorable image of the party (e.g., "doing a good job"), while 32% of the respondents indicated unfavorable images of the JCP (e.g., "too extreme," "dictatorial," etc.). The results of the survey indicated that the image of the JCP is improving: expressions of a favorable image of the JCP increased from 15% in 1972 to 19% in 1973, while expressions of an unfavorable image decreased from 41% in 1972 to 32% in 1973. For the results of the opinion survey conducted on April 6-7, 1973, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 311-14.

local-level assemblies in recent years. The JCP now holds over 2,600 of a total of 73,497 seats in prefectural, municipal, town, and village assemblies.[50]

The Communists' electoral success has been most remarkable in the highly industrialized urban centers of the crowded Pacific coastal belt where nearly two-thirds of the Japanese population is located. This success can be ascribed not only to the effective mobilization of the party's organizational and propaganda apparatus in elections, but also to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's inability to cope effectively with urban problems, such as traffic congestion, housing and land shortages, and photochemical pollution, which became serious by the end of the 1960's. The LDP, essentially a rural and semi-rural political party, has not been able to respond effectively to the demands of the urban population for solutions to these problems.[51] As a result, its decline has become quite pronounced in the urban centers. By spring of 1975, for instance, nine metropolitan and prefectural governments, including Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto in the Pacific coastal belt, came to be headed by "progressive" governors; 127 out of 666 city governments in such populous urban centers as Nagoya, Kōbe, and Yokohama are now administered by "progressive" mayors.[52] In many of these local elections, the JCP joined the other opposition parties to form a progressive coalition against the LDP.

Consequently, a substantial shift in the power relations between the LDP and the JCP has taken place in the urban districts in recent years. In the 1972 general elections, for instance, despite the fact that the LDP won a comfortable majority (271 out of 491 seats), the LDP's share of parliamentary seats dropped from 44 to 36 in the 10 largest urban areas, which had a combined total of 110 seats. In the same elections, the JCP increased its seats from 11 to 27, while the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) increased its share from 13 to 23 seats.[53] The fact that the JCP became the third-largest parliamentary party in the 1972 elections clearly indicates its astuteness in utilizing the voters' growing discontent with the LDP's inability to cope with the deteriorating urban prob-

[50] *Yearbook 1974* (fn. 22), 465.

[51] Isamu Togawa, *Jimintō no Kiki* (Tokyo: Gakugei Shorin 1973), 142-58. See also Hajime Ishii, *Jimintō yo Doko e Iku* (Tokyo: Nihon Seisansei Honbu 1974); and Yomiuri Shimbun sha, ed., *Jimintō Kiki Kokufuku e no Teigen* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha 1974).

[52] For the results of recent gubernatorial elections held in April 1975, see *Asahi Shimbun*, April 14, 1975. For the results of municipal elections held in the same month, see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 29, 1975.

[53] Ishii (fn. 51), 9.

lems.[54] Since the 1972 elections, the JCP has also effectively made use of the voters' discontent with the rampant inflation. As Japan relies more heavily than any other major industrial power on overseas sources of raw materials and foreign markets, she is more severely affected by the world's current economic ills, especially inflation. Japan has one of the worst rates of inflation of the industrialized countries (25 per cent in 1974), deriving in part from former Prime Minister Tanaka's grandiose program to "remodel" the Japanese archipelago. As originally conceived, the program sought to provide a comprehensive solution to Japan's urban and industrial problems by dispersing industrial plants to Japan's hinterlands, building model cities, and establishing social infrastructures that had been neglected in the race to increase economic productivity (or "GNP-ism"). However, the program set off a wave of speculation in land values. According to a Japanese government source, land prices rose an average of 79.5 per cent between January 1972 and January 1974.[55] The spiraling land values in turn precipitated price increases in other sectors. By the time the oil crisis of 1973 hit Japan, inflation had gotten out of hand and living costs had sharply increased. Japan's economic growth rate, which since 1955 had never been lower than 5 per cent[56] dropped to near zero in 1974. The speculative price manipulations of commodities by big business firms, which created frequent shortages and price hikes, were also distasteful to Japanese consumers. Against this background the JCP scored impressive electoral gains in the 1974 *Sangiin* (House of Councillors) elections; with 130 of 252 seats up for election, the JCP increased its seats from 11 to 20.[57] In these elections, the JCP not only criticized the ruling LDP's economic and urban policies, but also provided assurances that the JCP would probe into the sources of economic and urban problems once its candidates had been elected to the legislature. In short, the JCP's recent electoral successes can be attributed largely to the deradicalization of the party which has enabled it to adapt effectively to the challenges of the

[54] Togawa (fn. 51), 142-45. See also Hajime Shinohara, "Bunkyokuka suru Seiji Ishiki," *Asahi Jānaru*, December 22, 1972. For the urban voters' "greater pessimism about political processes," see Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 433-52, esp. 441-45.

[55] For an estimate by the Japanese Ministry of Construction, see *Japan Times Weekly*, December 7, 1974.

[56] Terutomo Ozawa, *Japan's Technological Challenge to the West: Motivation and Accomplishment* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1974), 23.

[57] For an excellent analysis of the 1974 *Sangiin* elections, see Hans Baerwald, "The *Tanabata* House of Councillors Election in Japan," *Asian Survey*, XIV (October 1974), 900-906.

electoral politics, and to some degree to the worsening urban and environmental problems which are the result of Japan's rapid economic growth in the 1960's.

In the wake of its continuing electoral successes, the JCP is stepping up its campaign, not only for an increase in its parliamentary seats, but also for the establishment of a "Democratic Coalition Government," in cooperation with other opposition parties, particularly with the Japan Socialist Party. According to a resolution adopted by the 11th Party Congress in 1971, the JCP claims to be an "independent, democratic political party, pursuing its ends by parliamentary means" for the "historic duty to establish during the 1970's democratic coalition government" on the basis of "an anti-imperialist united front dedicated to peace, neutrality and democracy."[58] The objective is to win control of the Diet in cooperation with other "democratic forces," such as the JSP, and to form a broad coalition government under the leadership of the JCP. These points were stressed even further at the party's 12th Party Congress, held in November of 1973, which adopted a resolution on "the Program of the Democratic Coalition Government."[59]

According to the JCP's 1973 documents, the party is willing to form such a Democratic Coalition Government with the other opposition parties on the basis of commonly acceptable policy programs, which should include: (1) termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; (2) protection of people's livelihood; and (3) preservation of the democratic parliamentary system of government.[60] The JCP has also indicated its flexibility on matters of economic policy by proposing nationalization only of "energy-related industries" (such as electricity, gas, coal, and nuclear power) during the interim period of the coalition government.[61]

In an obvious effort to alleviate the fears of the non-Communist opposition parties, the JCP also declared its willingness to return governmental powers to the Liberal Democratic Party, should the coalition government lose elections to the LDP in the future.[62] In that case, the resulting change of government would be "natural," and the JCP would return to the status of an opposition party, striving for the goal of building a new majority for a coalition government. The JCP also renewed the pledge it originally made in 1970 that under a JCP-

[58] *Yearbook 1971* (fn. 22), 598; see also Tawara (fn. 11), 51.
[59] For the text of the resolution, see Takeshige Kunimasa, *Kakushin Rengō Seiken* (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shoho 1974), 218-47.
[60] *Ibid.*, 219; see also *Yearbook 1974* (fn. 22), 475.
[61] *Ibid.*; see also Kunimasa (fn. 59), 237-38.
[62] *Yearbook 1974* (fn. 22), 475.

dominated government opposition parties would be free to compete for power, since the JCP would allow a multiparty system. Despite continuous overtures made by the JCP, however, the JSP has been less than willing to form a united front with the JCP. Its historical experience in this field has not been a pleasant one, in that the JCP has always utilized the united front at the expense of the Socialists' influence over the masses. Moreover, the JSP's internal political situation does not allow embracing Communist overtures for the sake of a united front.[63] Its right wing is strongly anti-Communist and is opposed to joining a united front with the JCP. The left wing of the JSP is also apprehensive about the danger of losing its influence by forming a united front with the JCP, which is better organized and has greater financial resources. Thus, there is little likelihood of the JSP's forming a united front with the JCP in the near future. At best, the JCP could expect its temporary cooperation for a limited purpose, such as a joint effort to elect a mutually acceptable mayor or governor at the local level.[64]

Prospects for the formation of a united front with other opposition parties are even worse. The anti-Communist Democratic Socialist Party is adamant in opposing a united front with the Communists, a sentiment which is reciprocated by the JCP. The Komeito has serious reservations about the JCP and continues to distrust the Communists in spite of its own policy shifts toward the left of center.[65] In the aftermath of the 1974 upper-house elections, there has been a noticeable trend among the non-Communist opposition parties to work for an anti-LDP, anti-JCP united front among themselves.

The trend is likely to continue, not only because of an irreconcilable ideological chasm, but also because of fundamental differences in approach to a coalition government. For instance, the non-Communist parties are quite apprehensive about the JCP's announced intention to transform the Democratic Coalition Government into a "People's Democratic Dictatorship."[66] Such a scenario is clearly unacceptable to

[63] Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1972), 55. See also Kunimasa (fn. 59), 92-100.

[64] *Ibid.*, 121-35. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 90-114.

[65] Kunimasa (fn. 59), 100-105; Hiroshi Kiuchi, *Kōmeitō to Sōkā Gakkai* (Tokyo: Godo Shuppan sha 1974), 187-205.

[66] For the JCP's three-stage scenario, see Iizuka (fn. 8), 84; Kōtaro Tawara, "Junan Rosen ni okeru Gensoku no Kakunin," *Jiyū*, XVI (January 1974), 91-100. The deradicalization of the party notwithstanding, the JCP does not deny the fact that its ultimate goal is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship; nor does it deny its intention to strive for the realization of that goal. Thus, in spite of the JCP's moderate program for a Democratic Coalition Government, JCP leaders have made it clear that when Japan "enters socialism," the JCP will introduce sweeping changes, including the total nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, abolishment of the Emperor

those non-Communist opposition parties that are firmly committed to the preservation of the existing framework of parliamentary democracy in Japan. Furthermore, the non-Communist opposition parties are deeply disturbed by the JCP's professed intentions to seek constitutional amendments (including the revision of Article IX of the Constitution, the renunciation of the war clause) and the abolishment of the Emperor system. The non-Communist opposition parties are united in their stand against any proposal for the revision of the existing Constitution,[67] especially Article IX; the conservative voters are hostile to any suggestion for the abolishment of the imperial throne. Furthermore, the non-Communist opposition parties are deeply apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the JCP, because the JCP has not renounced its subscription to Marxism-Leninism, nor has it denied its intention to strive for the realization of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the future. Unless these problems and differences between the JCP and the other opposition parties can be resolved, it is unrealistic to expect the development of a meaningful partnership.

In practice, therefore, a JCP-led Democratic Coalition Government remains essentially a political slogan without any prospect of realization in the 1970's. The LDP will in all probability remain the government party throughout the decade. Even if it should lose its majority in the lower house of the Diet, it will have little difficulty in establishing a coalition government with the moderate DSP or the Komeito.

V

A few basic conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis regarding the JCP's behavior and orientation since 1961.

First, it is quite clear that the JCP has undergone a process of deradicalization since 1961 under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto. This deradicalization became necessary because of the dismal failure of the violent revolutionary strategy from 1950 to 1955, which had crippled the party apparatus. Since 1961, the deradicalization of the JCP has taken the form of an increasing commitment to the parliamentary path

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system, and an overhaul of the existing Self-Defense Forces by way of constitutional amendments. For details of the JCP inner circle's thinking on the subject, see Kōichiro Ueda and others, "Nihon Kyōsantō wa Nani o Kangaedede Iruka," *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 51 (March 1973), 92-135. The article is based on over nine hours of interviews with the JCP's top policy planners, conducted by the staff of *Bungei Shunjū*. For a critical evaluation of this article, see Tsuneari Fukuda and others, "Rakkanteki na amarini Rakkanteki na," *ibid.*, 136-46.

[67] For the opposition parties' critical attitudes toward the JCP on constitutional questions, see Kunimasa (fn. 59), 20-24.

to revolution. As the JCP has succeeded in its drive for the expansion of its organizational strength and its electoral support, it has further changed its policy orientation by gearing its activities to electioneering. The continuing process of deradicalization conforms in general to Tucker's and Michels' thesis on the inverse relationship between organizational strength (worldly success) and the deradicalization of the Communist movement. In general, the JCP's behavior since 1961 also conforms to Triska's and Finley's hypothesis on the behavior of deradicalized Communist parties in industrialized countries.

Second, the steady expansion and growth of the JCP's organizational strength during the period of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity in Japan (1961–74) clearly deviates from Benjamin's and Kautsky's "curvilinear theory" of economic development and the strength of Communist parties. Nor does it conform to the hypothesis advanced earlier by Lipset concerning the inverse correlation between economic growth (i.e., per capita income) and the strength of the Communist parties. A plausible explanation for the JCP's deviation from these hypotheses may be found in the deradicalization of the party since 1961.

Third, the JCP's subscription to the parliamentary path to revolution is likely to be retained by the party in the future. It is clear that the JCP is not only subscribing to the parliamentary path to revolution, but that it is also increasingly following the strategy of the Western European Communist parties, especially the French and Italian, with which the JCP has been increasing its contacts in recent years.[68] There are growing indications that the Japanese Communists now believe that their party shares more common strategic problems with these European Communist parties than with the Communist parties of Asia, for the very simple reason that Japan, like France and Italy, is a highly industrialized, democratic society, where a "peaceful transition to

[68] Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 249-52; Iizuka (fn. 8), 158-61; Tawara (fn. 11), 190-92. In the autumn of 1968, a JCP delegation headed by Satomi Hakamata was dispatched to Paris and Rome for the purpose of exchanging views on the parliamentary path to revolution with Italian and French Communist leaders. See Iizuka (fn. 10), 135. In 1972, the JCP was host to an international conference of representatives of Communist parties of Western nations (France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, West Germany, and Australia). According to Miyamoto, the purpose of the conference was to "exchange reports on the outstanding features of the situation and party struggles in the advanced capitalist countries, and to learn from each other through exchanges of experience." Among various subjects discussed at the conference were problems of structural reform; the prospects of "peaceful revolution," with emphasis on the changes in the international situation since Lenin's time; and how to encourage the emergence of a socialist society out of the democratic capitalist society. For details, see *Yearbook 1973* (fn. 22), 487; Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 250.

socialism" is possible. So long as the Japanese Communists maintain that outlook, it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to follow the parliamentary path to revolution.

Fourth, despite the JCP's subscription to the parliamentary path to revolution, the party has not renounced its ultimate goal of establishing a Communist dictatorship in Japan. Not only does the party still subscribe to Marxism-Leninism, but it also does not deny its ultimate goal or even the possibility of non-peaceful revolution. The JCP's stubborn refusal to preclude the possibility of violent revolution, plus its professed intention to bring about a Communist system through prescribed stages, indicates its faithful adherence to the revolutionary doctrine (known as the theory of "peaceful transition to socialism") advocated and supported by the Communists in Western Europe and Soviet Russia. That is why the party is still on the blacklist of the Japanese police authorities under the purview of the Subversive Activities Control Act. However, the process of deradicalization has already brought about substantial changes in every aspect of the party's operation, and could affect its goal orientation in the future. At least such a possibility was hypothesized by Michels in connection with the European Marxist parties, when he pointed out that, in the course of deradicalization, the "revolutionary" party could become a "revisionist" party without admitting it.[69]

Finally, it should be pointed out that the JCP's parliamentary path to power is by no means assured of unlimited success in the future. Despite the deradicalization of the party's policy orientation, the JCP has not yet succeeded in overcoming the persistent suspicion of the non-Communists, many of whom are still quite apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the JCP.[70] As long as the JCP subscribes to Marxism-Leninism, no matter how eloquently it may explain its peaceful intentions, the fears of the non-Communists will persist. Furthermore, since it is operating essentially within a conservative milieu, its

[69] Michels (fn. 6), 370-73. See also Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: Norton 1969), 185-93; Leopold Labedz, "The End of An Epoch," *International Communism After Khrushchev* (fn. 19), 15. In discussing the deradicalization of the Italian Communist Party, Labedz points out, "In time, however, the change of means may affect the ends, and tactical requirements may affect the structure of the party."

[70] For the LDP's skepticism toward the JCP's "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government," see *Sankei Shimbun*, December 2, 1973; for the apprehension of the non-Communist opposition parties toward the possibility of the JCP's usurpation of the power in the event a coalition government is formed, see Kunimasa (fn. 59), 80-108, esp. 87-88; for a critical evaluation of the JCP's "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government" by a group of Japanese scholars, see "Minshu Rengō Seifu Kōryō Hihan," *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 52 (June 1974), 92-145.

increase in electoral gains will become slower and will eventually level off. As there are no immediate prospects for a rapid increase in the party's influence over youth, labor, and the farmers, the only promising source of votes is likely to remain in the alienated urban areas and protest votes.[71] The competition for these votes is already fierce among the opposition parties, especially between the JCP and the Komeito.[72] That is why many Japanese studies in this field forecast the leveling-off of the JCP's representation at about 10-12 per cent of the seats in the Diet once that level has been reached in the late 1970's.[73]

Unless the JCP can deradicalize itself further so as to make it acceptable to the non-Communist opposition parties, it seems quite unlikely that it will be able to get into a coalition government, even if the LDP should lose its control of the majority in both houses of the Diet. The most likely prospect, therefore, is that the JCP will remain essentially a medium-sized parliamentary opposition party in the manner of its counterparts in Western Europe.

[71] According to Tawara, the JCP's electoral successes can be attributed to its ability to "create a new community" for the uprooted urban dwellers by providing them with a new "value system." Since many urban voters have become uprooted from their traditional communities, and since many of them are clearly in need of a new community in their affluent yet alienated urban life, the parties that cater to the needs of these voters (i.e., the JCP and the Komeito) will continue to succeed in urban politics in the future. See Tawara (fn. 11), 199-212.

[72] According to Togawa, the JCP and the Komeito are getting votes from the same socioeconomic groups in the urban areas. Consequently, fierce competition and conflict between the two parties are inevitable. See Togawa (fn. 51), 149-51.

[73] For a summary of the forecasts made by Japanese scholars and political commentators on this subject, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 261-64. See also Tsuneo Watanabe, "Jimintō Kuzureru no Hi," *Chūo Kōron* No. 1038 (September 1973), 324, and his *Hokaku Renritsu Seiken ron* (Tokyo: Daiyamond sha 1974), 116.

APPENDIX

TABLE I

RESULTS OF THE 1972 LOWER HOUSE ELECTION

	No. of Seats won	*Pre-election Strength*	*No. of Votes*	*% of Total Vote*	*% in 1969**
LDP	271	297	24,563,078	46.85	47.63
JSP	118	87	11,478,600	21.90	21.44
JCP	38	14	5,496,697	10.49	6.81
Komeito	29	47	4,436,631	8.46	10.91
DSP	19	29	3,659,922	6.98	7.74
Other groups	2	0	143,019	0.27	0.17
Independents	14	3	2,645,530	5.05	5.30
Total	491	477 (14 vacancies)	52,423,477	100.00	100.00

Sources: Asahi Shimbun sha, *Asahi Nenkan 1973* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha 1973), 247.

* *Mainichi Nenkan 1970*, p. 83.

TABLE II

THE JCP VOTE IN ELECTIONS FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1946–1972

Election	*Total JCP Vote (rounded)*	*% of Total Vote*	*Number of Candidates Elected*
22nd (4/1946)	2,136,000	3.8	5
23rd (4/1947)	1,003,000	3.7	4
24th (1/1949)	2,985,000	9.8	35
25th (10/1952)	897,000	2.5	0
26th (4/1953)	656,000	1.9	1
27th (2/1955)	733,000	2.0	2
28th (5/1958)	1,012,000	2.6	1
29th (11/1960)	1,157,000	2.9	3
30th (11/1963)	1,646,000	4.0	5
31st (1/1967)	2,191,000	4.8	5
32nd (12/1969)	3,199,000	6.8	14
33rd (12/1972)	5,478,000	10.5	38

Source: *Asahi Nenkan 1973*, p. 247.

TABLE III

JCP MEMBERSHIP, 1945–1974
(estimated figures)

Year	*Total Membership*
1945*	1,000
1949	150,000
1955	20,000
1958	35,000
1961	80,000
1964	150,000
1966	270,000
1970	300,000
1972	300,000
1974** (Feb.)	340,000

Sources: Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Ikko sha 1973), 189-91.

* The 1945 figure is based on Shigetaro Iizuka, *Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Sekka sha 1969), 142.

** The 1974 figure is based on *Asahi Shimbun*, February 22, 1974.

TABLE IV

CIRCULATION OF *Akahata*, 1960–1974

Year	*Daily Edition*	*Sunday Edition*	*Total*
1960	58,000	70,000	128,000
1961	100,000	200,000	300,000
1962	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1963	150,000	500,000	650,000
1964	200,000	600,000	800,000
1965	200,000	900,000	1,100,000
1966	200,000	1,000,000	1,200,000
1967	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1968	300,000	1,000,000	1,300,000
1969	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1970	400,000	1,500,000	1,900,000
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	550,000	1,950,000	2,500,000
1973*	600,000	2,200,000	2,800,000
1974**	650,000	2,350,000	3,000,000

Sources: Hisamitsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodan sha 1973), 30.

* The 1973 figure is based on *Asahi Shimbun*, February 22, 1974.

** The 1974 figure is based on *Asahi Nenkan 1975*, p. 151.

TABLE V

VOTING RECORDS OF JCP DIET MEMBERS, 1967–1971

Diet	*Duration*	*Number of Government Bills Enacted*	*JCP Members' Voting Records*					
			For	%	*Against*	%	*Abstain*	%
55th	2/1967–7/1967	131	34	26	86	67	11	8
56th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
57th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
58th	12/1967–6/1968	90	29	32	52	58	9	10
59th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
60th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
61st	12/1968–8/1969	63	18	28.5	41	65	4	6
62nd	11/1969–12/1969	26	10	38	15	58	1	3
63rd	1/1970–5/1970	98	38	39	52	53	8	8
64th	11/1970–12/1970	27	12	44	5	18.5	10	37
65th	12/1970–5/1971	93	50	54	34	36.5	9	10
66th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
67th	10/1971–12/1971	14	7	50	5	36	2	14

Source: Kotaro Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo Shuppan-bu 1972), 64.